Carlos Slim got illegally rich


Received on 06/18/2014
This text was transmitted electronically. Deviations from the original are possible.



from the MP Gabriela Moser, friends to the Federal Minister of Finance

regarding the syndicate agreement between ÖIAG and America Movil


On April 23, 2014, the ÖIAG Supervisory Board approved a syndicate agreement between Telekom Austria and America Movil. This process took place under alarming circumstances. Initially there was no full supervisory board, as there was no replacement after the departure of supervisory board member Maria-Elisabeth Schaeffler, which violated the ÖIAG law. Then, according to their statement, part of the supervisory board - the block of employee representatives - was informed far too late and thus insufficiently about the contract. This group therefore stayed in protest at the meeting on April 23rd. remote. Recently, there was obviously serious resentment within the rest of the supervisory board. Because how can it be explained otherwise that another three chapter representatives stay away from this momentous decision. Since eight of the fourteen members of the supervisory board were absent, the committee had no quorum and remained so for more than six hours. Only after the President of the Supervisory Board Mitterbauer was flown in, the decision could be made late in the evening with a narrow majority. Given these circumstances, the question arises to what extent these processes were not illegal. Univ.Prof. Dr. Peter Doralt summarized his criticism of these processes in an interview in the newspaper Die Presse: "The real question is whether a supervisory board decision that has come about in this way is valid at all."

For Austria, Telekom Austria is a crucial infrastructure company for future development. In this context, the ÖIAG explains quite correctly (quote from “A high-performance and secure communication infrastructure forms the backbone of a modern information and knowledge society. It facilitates access to knowledge and connects people of all ages and national boundaries. With its future-oriented, comprehensive infrastructure, Telekom Austria is of indispensable importance both for Austria as a business location and for the Austrian population. "

In stark contrast to this is the dividend policy that ÖIAG imposed on Telekom and that hinders its development. The contrast between claim and reality becomes even sharper when you look at the new major shareholder of Telekom, to which ÖIAG has submitted with the syndicate agreement. Carlos Slim became the richest man in the world not because he manufactures innovative products, but because he has established a de facto monopoly for telecommunications services in Mexico and sells his products at far inflated prices. The OECD has described these machinations in an extremely critical report (OECD Review of Telecommunication Policy and Regulation in Mexico): "The lack of telecommunication competition in Mexico has led to inefficient telecommunications markets that impose significant costs on the Mexican economy and burden the welfare of its population. The sector is characterized by high prices, among the highest within OECD countries, and a lack of competition, resulting in poor market penetration rates and low infrastructure development. As highlighted above, the resulting loss of benefit to the economy is estimated at USD 129.2 billion (2005-2009) or 1.8% GDP per annum. "

So Mr Slim has damaged the Mexican economy by $ 129 billion in five years. Without Mr Slim's work, this country's GDP would be almost 2% higher. As the OECD notes, this loss of prosperity is primarily at the expense of the lower and middle classes.

For Carlos Slim, joining Telekom Austria is probably a strategic investment. One of the reasons why he is trying to gain a foothold in Europe is that there are increasing political efforts in Mexico to smash his monopoly. From Telekom's point of view, however, he can hardly be called a strategic investor. It does not bring expanded market opportunities or innovative technologies.

The takeover of Telekom Austria by America Movil is the consequence and the end of a long chain of undesirable political developments and personal misconduct. Instead of assigning clearly defined economic tasks to Telekom, it became the plaything of crazy deregulation and “depoliticization”. The high points of this development were a questionable expansion policy, which made third parties in particular rich, as well as the abuse of the group by political parties and management as a personal ATM. The owner representative ÖIAG watched this goings-on and evidently pursued his own agenda, which was democratically legitimized and was still in the interest of the Austrian citizens. All in all, the reputation and economic basis of an important state enterprise were destroyed. In this way, Telekom became a cheap takeover candidate.

The signing MEPs therefore provide the following


1) Has the entry of Carlos Slim into Telekom Austria been agreed between ÖIAG and BMF?

2) Were there consultations between ÖIAG and the BMF regarding the syndicate agreement, or did ÖIAG decide independently on this matter?

3) How many shareholder representatives voted for the syndicate agreement at the ÖIAG supervisory board meeting on April 23, 2014, how many against and how many abstained or were absent?

4) What did you do to make sure that the ÖIAG supervisory board resolution was legally binding?

5) When were the Telekom supervisory boards delegated by ÖIAG first informed about the syndicate agreement and its content?

6) When did this group of the Supervisory Board receive the syndicate agreement in full and in full, including all enclosures, side letters and other relevant documents?

7) When did the group of employee representatives on the supervisory board receive the syndicate agreement in full and in full, including all enclosures, side letters and other relevant documents?

8) If the employee representatives on the supervisory board were not informed of the syndicate agreement in the same way as the representatives of ÖIAG, did that constitute a violation of the German Stock Corporation Act? And if not, why not?

9) What steps have you taken to ensure that Austria does not have a Mexican fate, in particular that competition and price levels for telecommunications services are maintained?

10) The OECD demands that all shareholders in state-affiliated companies must be treated equally. The fact that a syndicate contract has been signed raises the suspicion that it is not. How is it ensured that other groups of shareholders as well as small shareholders are not disadvantaged?

11) How is the syndicate agreement ensured that both parties meet on an equal footing, or how can the republic's owner representatives block undesirable developments?

12) How are the voting rights of the telecom shareholders distributed?

13) In what cases can the Republic capital representatives vote against America Movil representatives?

14) What goals and tasks do the supervisory boards delegated by ÖIAG have to perform at Telekom?

15) One of the goals of the Austrian federal government is the expansion of broadband in Austria. Is that, for example, one of the tasks for which the representatives of the republic on the supervisory board have to work?

16) Does ÖIAG have the approval and all legal requirements to go along with Telekom's upcoming capital increases or to prevent them?

17) How will ÖIAG finance these capital increases?

18) How high is the tax loss for the republic after Slim's holding company Carso Telecom B.V. is registered in the Netherlands for tax reasons?

19) What do you think about the fact that the EU tries to prevent aggressive tax avoidance practices, but Austria does nothing against such practices, even in the most fundamental area of ​​a state-affiliated company?